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LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA:
HOW TO HAVE A REVOLUTION WITHOUT
A REVOLUTION
ROY L. PROSTERMAN*
"Fidel Castro is part of the legacy of Bolivar... [and he] also is
part of the frustration of that earlier revolution which won its
war against Spain, but left largely untouched the indigenous
feudal order."
-John F. Kennedy'
"The Second Declaration of Havana points out:
'In our countries two circumstances are joined: underdeveloped
industry and an agrarian regime of a feudal character. That is
why no matter how hard the living conditions of the urban work-
ers are, the rural population lives under even more horrible con-
ditions of oppression and exploitation. But, with few exceptions,
it also constitutes the absolute majority, sometimes more than
70 per cent of Latin American populations.
'Not counting the landlords who often live in the cities, the rest
of this great mass earns its livelihood by working as peons on
the plantations for the most miserable wages, or they work the
soil under conditions of exploitation indistinguishable from those
of the Middle Ages.
'These are the circumstances which determine that the poor popu-
lation of the countryside constitutes a tremendous potential revo-
lutionary force.' "
-Ernesto Che Guevara2
"While, evidently, a regime's desire to implant far-reaching
reforms is not a justification for establishing a rightist or a leftist
dictatorship, the great question that arises is how the 'revolution
of rising expectations' is to be concluded in the face of the power-
ful pressures and vested interests that, by definition, operate
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington Law School. A.B., 1954-
Chicago; LL.B., 1958, Harvard.
'STRATEGY OF PEACE (1960).
2 GUERRILLA WARFARE: A METHOD 3 (1964).
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freely in a democratic society. Premier Castro's belief that the
social reforms of his revolution could never be carried out in the
midst of an electoral campaign, or under a representative political
democracy of the type Cuba has known in the past, cannot, of
course, excuse his refusal to hold elections and his ultimately
implanting a Communist dictatorship. But it is a thought-pro-
voking argument, one that has captured the attention of millions
of increasingly impatient Latin Americans. After years of national
debate, Brazil has not been able to move ahead with any form of
land reform, and this is true everywhere except for Venezuela,
and to a small extent for Columbia and the Dominican Republic.
Whether the new government and Congress in Peru and Argentina
will be able to make a breakthrough in social reform is the great
question overshadowing the fact of their election....
[T]he record shows that most of the governments have not taken
even the initial steps . . . .Bogged down in domestic politics,
paralyzed by their parliaments, and held back by the local vested
interests, they have preferred to stand still, as if awaiting a
miracle that will solve the awesome economic and social problems
of Latin American land tenure.
"That no start has been made constitutes the greatest funda-
mental failure of the Alliance [for Progress] thus far."
-Tad Szulc3
"To rely on the peasant, build rural base areas and use the
countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities -- such was
the way to victory in the Chinese revolution ....
"The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the
revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward
to final victory."
-Lin Piao4
"Writing of his own country, Brazil's former Economics Minister
Furtado has warned that unless a land reform is begun, the
danger of 'Marxist-Leninist' revolution based, China-like, on the
peasant masses has to be reckoned with."
-Tad Szulc'
'THE WINDS OF REVOLUTION 230, 247-48 (rev. ed. 1965).
'LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF PEOPLES' WAR! 21, 48 (1965).
'THE WINDS OF REVOLUTION 230, 247-48 (rev. ed. 1965).
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It is almost universally recognized that land reform in Latin America
is of vital interest to all of the countries of the hemisphere, and that
it is long overdue.' The degree of concentration of landholdings in
the great estates (the latifundios) is astonishing: in Brazil, it appears
that 1.5 per cent of all landholdings account for over 48 per cent of
the farm area; in Chile, 1.4 per cent of holdings account for over
68 per cent of the farm area; in Ecuador, 0.17 per cent of holdings
account for 37 per cent of the farm land; in Venezuela, 1.69 per cent
of holdings account for 74 per cent of the farm land; in Guatemala,
0.15 per cent of holdings account for 41 per cent of the farm acreage,
and so on. For Latin America as a whole, it has been estimated that
roughly 90 per cent of the land belongs to 10 per cent of the owners,
and that holdings of over 1,000 hectares (over 2,470 acres) account
for only 1.5 per cent of the farms, but comprise over 64 per cent of
the farm land.7 By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that
in pre-revolutionary Cuba, 1.4 per cent of all holdings accounted for
47 per cent of the farm area.'
The rural population which lives directly under these conditions,
while it may be less than the 70 per cent of total population suggested
by the Guevara extract above, is nonetheless about 50 to 60 per cent
of the total Latin American population.'
The statistics on land distribution are taken from articles written in
1956 and 1961, but it seems clear that little has changed since then:"
Half of all Latin Americans (obviously the poorer half) still make their
living as farmers. Yet by 1965, according to a detailed study by the
Inter-American Development Bank, "very little" had been done to imple-
ment land reform under the Alliance for Progress, though laws for that
purpose were passed in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
What has gone wrong? One author suggests that "A key issue, and
perhaps the most controversial one, is the expropriation procedure.""
'The author's comments are intended to apply in large part to other less-
developed areas as vell, but there are few if any where reform has lagged so far
behind, and certainly none of greater strategic importance to the United States.
"These figures are from Kling, Toward a Theory of Power and Political Insta-
bility in Latin America, in THE DYNAmIcS OF CHANGE IN LATiN AmEIcAN
POLrTICS 130, 132-33 (Martz ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as MARTZ], and Carroll,
The Land Reform Issue in Latin America, in MAroz 172, 173-74. Carroll adds that
"This degree of concentration is far greater than that in any other world region of
comparable size." Id. at 174.
'Kling, Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,
in MARTZ 133.
'See COLE, GEOGRPHY OF WORLD AffAIRs 110-11 (2d ed. 1963).
"THE FoREiGN PoLIcy ASSOCIATIoN, GREAT DEcisioNs 1966, at 78 (1966). See
also SzuLC, THE Wiims OF REvOLUTION 54-58 (rev. ed. 1965).
' Carroll, The Land Reform Issue in Latin America, in MARTz 180.
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But those in the legal profession-or the economists, for that matter-
have thus far done very little to suggest ways of facing this "key
issue." Indeed it is the main burden of this article to argue that most
of what has been suggested to date has been better suited to erecting
the expropriation question into a permanent roadblock (permanent,
that is, to the extent that present Latin American governmental struc-
tures are not destroyed by revolutionary uprisings), than to findings
realistic legal and institutional accommodations which will permit land
reform to go forward on a broad scale.
The point at which we have gotten off the track of reality seems
to me to be tolerably clear. Much of the land-reform discussion of
recent years has involved formulations of the duty to pay compensation
to the landlords which have either frankly accepted or outrightly
advocated paying less-than-full or no compensation under appropriate
circumstances, e.g., tracing back old land titles or rights in the peas-
ants or campesinos,12 or employing existing legislation on the books
which could be used, in theory, to assert rights to uncompensated
taking of inefficiently exploited or unused land. 3
' See Karst, Latin American Land Reform: The Uses of Confiscation, 63
MiCHa. L. REv. 327 (1964). Apart from his views on how to accomplish land
reform-with the compensation portions of which I am in strong disagreement-
Professor Karst has certainly supplied,, in the course of his admirably-researched
article, a succinct description of what land reform is intended to do, id. at 359:
Giving rights in land to the campesinos is instrumental to feeding and hous-
ing them better, replacing their old attitudes of servility with a new sense of
community responsibility, giving them a voice in the management of their
lives, and giving them an incentive to educate their children. Other aims of
land reformers are to break the restrictions on economic activity that are
implicit in a hacienda society and to promote the development of the economy,
partly through increased agricultural production (with some corresponding
increase in the rural sector's demand for other products) and partly through an
improvement in the level of investment.
See Galbraith & Morton, Problems of Finuancing Land Distribution, Report of
the Working Party, in LAND TENuR.E 492, 497, 499 (Parsons ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as LAND TENUe]. Even writers with marked affinity for formulations in-
volving "full compensation" have indicated somewhat qualified views of what this
means. See CHEN CHENG: LAND REFORM iN TAIWAN (1961). The author, Vice
President and Premier of the Republic of China, emphasizes that compensation
paid to the landlords was "fair and reasonable," id. at xxi. Yet he notes that the
first step in land reform was to set maximum rent paid by tenant farmers at 37.5% of
the total annual yield of the main crop, id. at xii, 18-48, versus a prior average level
of 55%, id., table 5, at 309. He then points out that "the average decline in the value
of tenanted land in the various counties and municipalities after rent reduction was
from one-third to one-half as compared with the period before rent reduction," id. at
45 (indeed his more detailed figures suggest declines of 60-70% were common, see id..
table 6, at 310), and blandly concludes, id. at 46:
While the decline in the value of land made it easier for the tenant farmer to
buy land, the landlord's anxiety to get rid of his land also provided a favorable
environment for the eventual purchase of land by the Government and its resale
to the incumbent tiller in the next stage, the Land-to-the-Tiller stage, of our
land reform.
A somewhat dissenting characterization of what might be thought not-too-dissimilar
[ VOL. 42: 189
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In Latin America, actual "compensation" schemes in the two instan-
ces where sweeping land reform has been undertaken (Mexico and
Bolivia) have reflected an uncomplicated version of this view with a
vengeance, through simple non-issuance of the bonds that were to have
been used to pay the landlords. 14 An even more sweeping view, in
terms of underlying legal theory, has been emphasized in some more
formal Latin American expressions on the general duty to compensate
aliens in cases of expropriation. The Restatement (Second), Foreign
Relations Law of the United States expresses the established position
of the United States that international law requires that "just compen-
sation" be paid upon the expropriation of the property of an alien. 5
"Just compensation" is "adequate in amount" -which in turn, nor-
mally means "equivalent to the full value of the property taken"-
and is "paid with reasonable promptness," in "a form that is effectively
realizable by the alien." 6 But the Reporters' Notes point out that
the rule of just compensation is questioned by some Latin American
states, both on the basis of the general position that aliens are not
entitled to any better treatment than their own nationals, 17 and in
terms of the specific contention that "international law imposes no
duty to pay compensation when property is taken pursuant to a
general program of social or economic reform."' Clearly these views
carry considerable implication for the theory of compensation to be
applied to expropriation of nationals' property as well.
Yet it appears increasingly clear that the points of view which
excuse or justify the payment of less-than-full compensation for expro-
priated land-at least for those who seek tangible results rather than
facts in South Korea is found in Bunce, Financial Aspects of Land Reform in the
Far East, in LAND TENURE 481, 484:
The general terms of the Republic of Korea land reform program were that the
owner of the land was given 150 per cent of the total value of one year's crop.
In other words, he was allowed 30 per cent of the crop over a five year period.
When in the past he had been receiving up to 60 per cent of the crop per year.
30 per cent of the crop for a five year period is almost confiscation.
See also text accompanying note 26 infra.
14 See note 23 infra.
'RESTATnEENT (SEcoND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§185 (1965).10Id. §§ 187-88.
See id. § 165, comment a.
'RId., Reporters' Note 2, § 185. This and Note 4 point out, however, that all Latin
American states apparently accept some international standard for compensating an
alien, as expressed in their unanimous adherence to a 1962 resolution of the General
Assembly which provides for "appropriate compensation, in accordance with the
rules in force in the State taking such measures ... and in accordance with
international law." The meaning of the qualifier, "appropriate," and the logical function
of the connective "and" are, of course, sufficiently debatable to render this formulation
a rather equivocal one.
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the luxury of excoriating prose-are utterly self-defeating. 9 The
author is willing to concede for purposes of argument all of the moral
points that the proponents of such views might score, put them in as
overstated a form as you will: that not only some, but all, of the
expropriated landlords will not be educated upper-middle class families
with children to send to universities and reasonable desires for travel
and leisure planned around the value of their landholdings, but, on
the contrary, will be (even when they are United States corporations)
monsters of iniquity bent upon squeezing every last cent of profit
from the crushing labors of ignorant, darker-skinned and utterly
impoverished peons.
Conceding all this, I wish to present here a proposal for a markedly
different solution from that of uncompensated (or poorly-compensated)
expropriation. It is a solution for which I intend to spend much of
the next year or two digging out the supporting data, and I am pleased
that these pages of the Review are now available for an initial exposi-
tion of such ideas without all the ponderous apparatus of completed
scholarship, which in this case will require considerable field study.
Here then is the idea, the framework:
The view that land reform should be carried out with less-than-full
compensation of the landlords must be discarded because it will not
work, or will not work without an unacceptably high risk of bloody
conflict in its implementation.
The holders of latifundios in South America still wield considerable
political power, both through direct political office and through connec-
tions in the army. They thus have considerable power to veto land
reform whenever they have the incentive to do so; and the incentive
provided by any scheme of inadequate compensation is clearly so
great that exponents of such schemes must expect a rather considerable
shift in the social-power structure to permit land reform in the form
that they propose or espouse it. I regard the subject of land reform
as too important to wait for such a shift, and I certainly do not want
it-nor, assuredly, do I suppose the authors of the schemes referred
to want it-to be accelerated by violent revolution.
What can be done is further limited by the presence of United
States corporations as landholders in Latin America." Any expropria-
" For a discussion of the effect of such points of view as to expropriation and,
especially, "creeping expropriation" on foreign investment in less developed coun-
tries, see Comment, Increasing the Flow of Private Funds to the Underdeveloped
Countries: A Proposal, 42 WASH. L. REv. (1966).
- See Karst, supra note 12, at 329:
Not the least of the tensions involved in the formulation of United States
[ VOL. 42 : 189
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tion without fair compensation affecting their interests would no doubt
deeply aggravate the hostility that would be felt by a large segment
of our own population towards any foreign government that expropri-
ated property even of its own nationals without paying a fair compen-
sation.
Thus the thrust of a solution which furnishes a workable basis for
land reform, it seems to me, must be that it offers compensation
sufficiently full and adequate to disarm the opposition-both among
the landholders and here at home-of any effective arguments, except
perhaps the residual, and politically unappealing, argument that they
would lose the brute power represented by the land and the dwellers
upon it.
To thus disarm the opposition, and achieve the minimum political
conditions for an effective land reform program, I think the following
four basic points must be observed:
(1) The promise to compensate cannot depend alone upon the word
of the expropriating authority, since such promises have been
violated in the past.
(2) The measure of compensation must depend upon the value of
the land to the present landholders, viewed in favorable, non-
coercive circumstances, without downward adjustment to reflect
threatened deprivation of benefits or increase of burdens.
(3) The measure of compensation must be independent of domestic
inflationary trends, although this does not preclude deferring
compensation or providing for its reinvestment in other domestic
undertakings, both of which may be highly desirable.
(4) Full satisfaction of these conditions appears to require the
establishment of an international consortium of the industrial-
ized nations to guarantee the direct obligations of payment to
the landlords undertaken by national governments, although
the actual outlays of such a consortium, as I hope can be
demonstrated fairly persuasively, are likely to remain a very
minor fraction of the value of the land expropriated.
(1) Guarantee of Compensation: The guiding star for non-revolu-
tionary but effective land reform is to be avoidance of the active, or
at least hyper-active, opposition of the present landholding class.2 ' It
policy toward Latin America is antagonism between the need to make radical
changes in land tenure structures and the interest of some North American
investors in preserving their holdings in land.
Kling, Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,
in MAf TZ 132-33, cites an unusually candid reply by the government of Chile to a
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is difficult to see how any purely-locally sponsored deferred compensa-
tion,22 normally bonds, could be widely acceptable after the Mexican
and Bolivian experiences.23 Perhaps field-study will show the contrary.
I am inclined to doubt it.
(2) Valuation: This is a thorny problem, but not an insuperable
one. Land must presently pass in private transactions on a basis the
parties feel is fair (leaving aside, for the moment, the possible question
of an "abnormal" market).24 The annual value of the crops to the
United Nations questionnaire as emphasizing "the difficulty of modifying the pattern
of land ownership":
"Owing to the economic and political structure of the country, land reform in
Chile is difficult to carry out. Landholders who would be affected by any action
of an economic, political, administrative, legal, or social nature will vigorously
oppose its implementation, and their political and economic influence is very
powerful."
Note also the quotations from SZULc, op. cit. supra note 10, at 230, 247-48. This
gravely troubling book also points out that vast numbers of land-poor peasants have
moved to the cities, forming an additional potential for revolutionary ferment in
waterless, sewerless colonies of incredible squalor which, as the author at one point
remarks, "make New York's East Harlem look like a couch of luxury." Id. at 49-54.
See International Labour Office, Why Labour Leaves the Land, in Two NVoi.Ds OF
CHANGE 163, Table 1, at 170-71, 179 (Feinstein ed. 1964). As to the farm laborers,
tenants or sharecroppers themselves, Mr. Szulc, who is Latin American correspondent
for the New York Times, describes many of them as living in virtual bondage and
others as under constant threat of starvation, with per capita incomes quite generally
in the range of $75-120 a year. Szu-.c, op. cit. supra at 54-58.
It is difficult to find words vivid enough to describe the intensity of the need to
find legal and institutional accommodations that will allow these countries to
undertake programs of basic land reform.
' Cash compensation for a large-scale land expropriation is rare. It is likely to
be highly inflationary, both disrupting the economy and giving the landlords some-
thing which plummets in value even as they are all in the act of receiving it in
hand. See note 31 infra.
In Mexico, only a small fraction of the owners of confiscated land received the
bonds that were supposedly to compensate them; and in Bolivia, the bonds authorized
by the reform law have never been issued and apparently never will be. See Karst,
supra note 12, at 340-41 n.53. The Mexican and Bolivian reforms-and the Puerto
Rican, discussed infra-are the only significant Latin American land reforms (apart
from Cuba) to date. These accompanied, respectively, the Mexican Revolution of
1911 and the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, the only two Latin "revolutions," apart
from Cuba, that have truly been a "sudden and radical change .. . which struck at the
roots of the previous order." Patch, Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary
Setting, in SocIAL CHANGE I r LATN AMERICA TODAY 108 (Adams ed. 1960). In
Mexico, close to 76 million acres were distributed between 1910 and 1945, see WOLF,
SoNs OF THE SHAKING EARTH 248 (1962) (although most of this was pasture and
forest land, see note 40 infra), and see generally Dur-An, Agricultural Co-operation in
Mexico in Relation to Small Landholdings, in LAND TENURE 311-12. While only about
6% of these are estimated to have been distributed gratis in theory, under the idea of
making restitution of lands unlawfully seized, see Karst, supra note 12, at 335 & n.29,
the fact that bonds were not issued for the bulk of the land which was in theory
being expropriated for compensation may be in large part because, even for that land,
that "in the background was the theory of restitution." Id. at 337. The Bolivian reform
law also made provision for uncompensated restitution of usurped lands, see Patch,
op. cit. supra at 127, a provision which "in practice, recognized the de facto occupations
of land which had already been carried out by the campesinos." Ibid.
See 1 BONBRiGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 417-19 (1937). On valuation problems
generally see also McMicHAE r.L & O'K~xE, LEAsEs 115-25 (5th ed. 1959); ORGES.,
VALUATIONW UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953).
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landlord-his net return, whether it be in the form of a percentage
of crop value collected from tenant farmers or the direct return from
sale of crop less wages paid for labor and other expenses of raising
the crop-should furnish a helpful guide, although the exact capital-
ization factor may be troublesome. If the program is bona fide, it
should not prove impossible to reach a valuation the landlord will
regard as fair.-"
The chief things to keep in mind in valuation, it appears to me,
are the factors which should not affect valuation if the reform is to be
accomplished without serious risk of armed conflict:
(a) The value should not be artificially lowered by adoption or
threatened adoption of higher inheritance, property or income
taxes.-6 Possibly tax changes could contemporaneously occur,
if it were clear that they were not specifically aimed at lowering
land values preparatory to expropriation. They should definitely
not be part of the land-reform "package."
(b) The value should not be artificially lowered by placing or
threatening to place ceilings on rents,27 or price-controls on
crops. 28
(c) The reform should not be carried out in the shadow of threats
to use other proposed or existing regulatory legislation, such as
special eminent domain statutes or statutes relating to taking
unused land which, in theory, might "legally" allow uncompen-
See note 40 infra.
"'But see remarks of Bunce, in LAND TENURE 487.
' But see note 13 sufra. Note that in Taiwan, a government with assured control
over a large (and chiefly non-indigeneous) army was able to effect land reform
despite this kind of prolegomena.
The Japanese and Korean land reforms were also accomplished under governments
operating, then, in the immediate shadow of United States protection.
By contrast, it should be kept constantly in view that, apart from the very special
case of the United States commonwealth, Puerto Rico, see generally Rosenn, Puerto
Rican Land Reform: the History of an Instructive Experiment, 73 YALE L.J. 334(1963), the institutional and political framework of Latin America has thus far
allowed sweeping land reform only as part of sweeping revolutionary change, in
Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba, and the history of these experiments is likely to make
the entrenched interests even more gun-shy than before, see note 23 supra. Yet it is
precisely the burden of this article that-while Latin America must have land reform,
both to alleviate human misery and to build a stable rural middle class as a counter-
active to revolutionary pressures-it would be tragic if it could have it only as part of
such a sweeping revolutionary change, which today would be only too likely to be
Communist or Castroite in nature. Therefore, it would appear to follow that it will be
wise to espouse such reforms based on a reasonable accommodation with the entrenched
economic interests, one which at the same time is consistent with our own frequently
espoused notions of "just compensation."
" Conceivably, general controls on rents or prices could satisfy the proviso stated
in the last sentence of (i), but this seems more dubious than in the case of taxes.
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sated or only partially compensated taking (including the "creep-
ing expropriation" type of taking) by the government. 29
In sum, a fair price should be determined in an atmosphere free
from overtones of coercion. If it is made crystal-clear from the
beginning that this is how the land-reform program will work, the
chances that a strong opposition will coalesce should be significantly
reduced.
(3) Inflation: the rate of inflation in some parts of the world, most
markedly in large parts of Latin America, has ranged from serious
to appalling.3 To defer compensation to the landlord normally will
mean to give bonds,3' and to give 15- or 20-year bonds in 1967
payable in the same amount of currency in 1982 or 1987 is, in many
countries, essentially to give nothing in terms of principal, and to
give virtually nothing in terms of interest after the first few years.
There is now, however, substantial precedent for issuance of bonds
tied to the price of a commodity. To implement land reform in
Taiwan, two series of bonds were issued, payable in terms of future
monetary value equivalent to the cost, at that future date, of a stated
quantity of rice (and, to some extent, payable in rice itself rather than
the monetary equivalent) or sweet potatoes, respectively.32 In Korea,
the bonds were payable in terms of the monetary equivalent of a stated
quantity of rice.3" In the very limited program in Columbia, mortgage
'But see material cited at note 13 supra.
General consumer price indexes in 1963, based on 1958 = 100:
Brazil: 675
Argentina: 491
Chile: 274
Colombia: 164
Bolivia: 152
On the other hand, Mexico was 111, Venezuela was 106, Ecuador was 115, and most
Central American countries' prices were quite stable.
While the Vietnamese war has probably accelerated some of the inflationary
movements in Asia, the 1958-1963 figures there are a little more encouraging. India,
the Philippines, Paldstan and Thailand had price increases ranging from 5% to 17%
during these periods. Indonesian prices, however, went up 12 times over.
Figures are from STATISTICAL YEImOoK: OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1964, consumer
price index tables at 520-26 [hereinafter cited as YEAP0OoK].
3I See Galbraith & Morton, Problems of Financing Land Distribution, in LAND
TENURE 492, 496-97.
In Japan, "the postwar inflation ... made the price of the land very cheap."
Owada, Land Reform in Japan, in LAND TENURE 219, 222. Bonds were issued, but
the price of brown rice-the staple commodity-reflecting inflationary pressures,
increased more than tenfold within two years. Ibid.
To pay cash is normally simply to resort to the printing press, and thus to ensure
the prompt deflation of the payment given. Bonds are the generally recognized
currency of land reform, although there are important secondary questions-such as
negotiability, or partial negotiability, e.g., for purposes of investing in basic
domestic enterprise, versus non-negotiability-which are briefly dealt with in the
next section.
' See text accompanying note 40 infra.
' See Bunce, Financial Aspects of Land Reform in the Far East, in LAND TENURE
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instruments payable in fixed amounts of coffee have apparently been
used.34
A single commodity may not be enough, however, especially if it
is one whose real value depends not on an essentially inelastic domestic
consumption market, but on the vagaries of world commodity prices."3
A general price index may therefore furnish a preferable guide. Indeed,
a recent Chilean constitutional amendment provides for "a system of
annual readjustment of the balance of the compensation, with the
object of maintaining its value."36
There thus seems strong reason, if the bonds issued to the land-
owners are to be fully compensatory, to tie them to a broader general-
price index.
(4) Method and Cost:
481, remarks at 486. The author states that "this solution was an important factor in
persuading the landlords to accept the land reform program," id. at 486, although he
had earlier conceded that given the overall payment calculation the taking was "almost
confiscation." See note 13 mpra.
See Galbraith & Morton, op. cit. supra note 31, at 492, 496.
The value per unit of Latin American agricultural exports in 1959-1961 was
only about three-fourths the value per unit of those same exported products in 1952-
1953. (Although the quantity of exports increased as an offset-but this introduces
a number of possible new variables, such as increase in amount of land under
cultivation, or more intensive cultivation of existing land accompanied either with
greater use of fertilizers or with depletion of the soil: it would thus seem on a
preliminary view that fluctuations in value per unit of the crop produced may be a
fair way of predicting the fluctuations in value of the land, to the extent that units
of that crop are taken as the sole measure of the land's value. That is to say, only the
per unit value and not the possible increase in units produced per acre need be
considered as a primary determinant of value.) See III PROCEEDINGS OF THE
UNiTED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 254-55 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROCEEDINGS]. The 1959-1961 export unit price of coffee was 64% of the
1952-1953 price. Cereals were 72%, cotton was 70%. Ibid. See also YARaooKc 499,
at subtable 17. Sugar has, of course, been another product subject to drastic price
decline.
50% to 60% of Brazilian exports consisted of coffee, over 70% of Columbian exports
were coffee, and coffee accounted for 56% of the exports of the Central American
republics as of the middle of the last decade. Kling, Toward a Theory of Power and
Political Instability in Latin America, in MAREz 130, 133. Coffee, or other export
crops, need not, of course, constitute the basis on Which "commodity bonds" are
made payable. For a detailed account of the problems of the "coffee economy," see
FURTADO, THE ECoNOMIc GROWTH OF BRAZn. (1963).
" Karst, supra note 12, at 339 n.44. See generally Comment, The Chilean Land
Reform: A Laboratory for Alliance-for-Progress Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 310
(1963). It has been suggested that, as between general-price-index "purchasing-
power" bonds and ones repayable in terms of particular principal crops, "the latter
would be simpler to administer and easier to understand." Galbraith & Morton,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 492, 496.
The relative desirability of the two types would seem to me to turn on (1)
whether a well-kept general price index is or can be made available, and (2)
whether the crop which is the alternative benchmark is one subject to value
fluctuation of a significant nature in relation to what available data show to be the
general cost of living. If the answer to (2) is "yes" and the trouble is in (1), the
institutional machinery suggested at text accompanying note 37 infra may well be
able to solve this very limited problem. Thus, I am unimpressed by the objections
and inclined to think the presumption should lie in favor of compensating the
former landlords through general-cost-of-living bonds.
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(a) Method: At the heart of the present proposal for viable land
reform is the idea that supplementary activities of a financially strong
and politically trustworthy outside agency are necessary to insure
that standards of just compensation will be met. Meeting the condition
set forth in (1) above clearly requires, and credible assurance of
the implementation of (2) and (3) reasonably calls for such activities.
The most logical way to carry them out, and to spread the risks
involved in them, would seem to be through an international con-
sortium of developed countries, which would in effect subscribe to
the capital of an international insurance corporation formed to under-
write the obligations of the country undertaking land reform towards
the holders of its land-reform bonds.
That such an international guaranteeing consortium should be cre-
ated to aid in accomplishing land reform is the central point of the
present article, coupled with the proposition that what the consortium
guarantees will be an obligation which fully reflects the standards of
just compensation.
Quite possibly such a multilateral insuring activity for Latin Ameri-
can land reform could be tied to the Inter-American Development
Bank or operate within the framework of the Organization of American
States. Effective multilateral participation by high-level officials of
the Latin nations from the earliest stage would seem highly desirable.37
(5) Cost: If such an agency insists on certain minimal safeguards
in the land-reform program, it would seem as a matter of preliminary
judgment that the costs to the underwriters should not be a large
proportion of the cost of the whole program: on the order of a few
percentage points of the value of the land being transferred. There
are, however, ancillary costs which should probably be subsidized by
the consortium as part of a successful total program.
In Formosa, land reform was accomplished by paying the landlord
two and one-half times the annual value of the main crop."8 On this
Cf., e.g., SZULC, op. cit. supra note 10, at 258-65. This would include the stages
at which decisions were made on the particularity with which standards of com-
pensation, priority of taking of land, minimum and maximum sizes of holdings and
on other important questions were to be spelled out as part of the "insurance
contract" versus the extent to which such "interstitial" matters were to be left up to
the particular countries themselves. In general, the fuller the participation of the
affected nations the more possible it should be to reach accords on at least meaningful
minimum standards for resolution of such particular matters.
' See CHEN CHENG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 78.Quite possibly, some minimum standard for valuation of the land taken can be
built into the international guaranty program, with actual variations to be worked
out on a local basis. If, for the moment (and remembering that the prior "rent
reduction" might affect our figures by as much as a factor of 2) we lean on the
Taiwan experience, a figure for tenanted or share-cropped land of 2'2 times annual
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basis, 344,000"9 acres of land were purchased by the Government,
chiefly with 10-year bonds bearing 4 per cent interest. The principal
crop value or 6 times annual rental (if annual rent ran in the region of one-half
annual crop value, as in pre-reform Japan, see Owada, Lanrd Reform it; Japan,
in LAim TENURE 220, Korea, and Taiwan) might develop as a minimum standard.
In India, compensation was varied according to the size of the parcel, with the biggest
landowners given 3 times the annual rent and the smallest 30 times the annual rent.
See remarks of Dantwala, in LAiD TENURE 490. Land values in various regions may,
of course, reflect population densities and the intensely practical fact whether land
ownership may be an assurance against a serious threat of, literally, starvation.
The Indian discrimination according to size of holding clearly seems of a piece
with the views earlier described on effecting less-than-full compensation. Indeed,
the Indian delegate whose informal remarks are reported at the page cited then
commented that "You will observe probably that this very small compensation
[i.e., of the big owners] is not much different from confiscation," but then attempted
to justify it by the alleged dubiety of the "ownership rights" of the big landholders.
Ibid. Compare note 23 supra.
However, there might be difficulties in applying only a capitalized-earnings
standard and achieving any acceptable valuation for the "hacienda" type of latifundia
holding, which tends to be the polar opposite of the "plantation" type. The latter is
capital-intensive, producing cash crops often for export and often employing laborers
for a cash wage, a kind of "agricultural factory." The former tends to be the
personal feoff of a socially prominent family-although they may be frequently or
permanently absentee-and to be characterized by inefficient methods, low-capital-
investment, and a total production which does not reflect the full capacity of the
land, often being hardly above a subsistence level. See Tannenbaum, The Hacienda,
in MAnrz 27-34; Karst, supra note 12, at 346-56. Present Latin American statutes
which describe the land available for expropriation tend to focus on inadequately
cultivated or inefficiently operated land. See id. at 349-50.
Professor Karst suggests that one acceptable mode of "confiscation" of the
socially non-utilitarian haciendas may be to give compensation on the basis of
capitalized current earnings, without regard to potential earnings or, apparently,
to transactions in the land market which might reflect that potential. See id. at
356-72, especially at 369-72. (I would assume that he would also accept a very low
capitalization factor-see his approbatory references in this context to "The pretense
that compensation is being made" and "the myth of compensation," id. at 371, a pre-
tense or myth which he supports as helping to assure the campesinws of their good title
and to maintain social order in such a "social revolution." Ibid.)
The program suggested in the present article does not, in itself, purport to lay
down any requirements as to the order of selection of lands to be expropriated
(although almost any application of a "fair value" or "just compensation" require-
ment might have some influence in suggesting the priority of the expropriation of
the hacienda over that of the plantation-type of operation), so that choosing the
hacienda as the first to go is fine. But any suggestion for compensating the
hacicnda holders on a basis which clearly-and deliberately-ignores value-factors
which are likely to be relevant to the owners and to have at least some recognition in
any land-market transactions, is thoroughly inconsistent with the basic premises of
the present article. If we are to be realistic about having non-revolutionary land
reform in Latin America, we must be willing to accept a figure which encompasses
a fair valuation of the complex of factors which comprise the hacienda. Earnings
may be a highly significant factor in this valuation process, but to limit ourselves
rigidly to capitalized earnings here is probably, putting it simply, to make non-
revolutionary land reform impossible. The minimum figure based on capitalized
earnings thus becomes a floor upon which the further processes of local accommoda-
tion and conciliation to be developed under the overall guarantee program-apart
from the question of how particularly they are to be spelled out in the insurance
agreements themselves-build a final valuation which, while it may not satisfy the
landlord entirely, does not dissatisfy him sufficiently so that he attempts to use his
existing political power to destroy the program. The minimum figure and the
prospects and goodwill for building an acceptable final figure must, of course, be
attractive (and apparent) enough from the beginning so that the landlords do not
collectively block the program ab initio.
" See CHENG CHENG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 76.
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was payable in the cash equivalent, at time of payment, of 1.26 billion
kilograms of rice and 440 million kilograms of sweet potatoes (al-
though some of the rice bonds allowed payment in kind); the interest
was similarly payable in terms of quantities of rice and sweet pota-
toes.
4 0
"See id. at 75-77, 217-18, 321-24. The bonds were redeemable in 20 semi-annual
installments.
Calculating a value per pound of roughly 6 cents for rice and sweet potatoes, see
PROCFEDINGS 292-93, this indicates a total payment of about $200 million in bonds.
In addition, 30% of the purchase price was paid in "government enterprise stock
shares," id. at 75, which leads to calculation of a total "price" of about $800 per acre
(this compares well with a $700 per acre figure which can be calculated for public
lands sold to the peasants, from the figures in id. at 311). If the choice of the
2Y2 times-main-crop-value figure, and the resulting $800 per acre calculation were
about proportionate to the decline in value of farm land, as measured by open-
market sales, after compulsory rent reduction (to 37%), and before the acquisition
program, see note 13 supra, the figures suggested for a "normal" market would
seem closer to 5 times the annual value of the main crop, or about $1600 an acre.
On the other hand, Formosa has one of the highest population densities in the world,
over twice that of India. See YsAoo 33. Even in Puerto Rico, with a population
density nearly as great (density figures, incidentally, which are about 15 times
those for the United States and Mexico and about 30 times those for nearly all of
South America, id. at 29-32), costs in the land reform program apparently ran-
although in terms of 1940's prices-about $150 per acre. See Rosenn, supra note 27, at
340 n.37.
Even in rich farming areas like Iowa, average values for United States farmland
today do not run much above $250 per acre, including buildings. See STATIsTMIL
ABSTRACT OF THE UxTED STATES, table No. 875, at 615 (1965).
In Brazil, the total cropland-exclusive of grazing land-amounts to about 2% of
the country's area, or less than 50 million acres. In Argentina, it is under 70
million acres. In Columbia, under 7 million acres; in Peru, under 6 million; in
Chile, under 1 million; in Ecuador, under 3 million; in Venezuela, again, under
3 million. See COLE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 129. If we assume that one-half the
existing cropland will be affected by sweeping land reform (in Mexico, it was
claimed that about 23% of total area holdings was distributed to tjide farmers, but
only about one-quarter of the land distribution was cultivated land, see Kling,
Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America, MARTZ
133; Dur~n, Agricultural Co-operation in Mexico in Relation to Small Landhold-
ings, in LAND TEiURE 311-12) this suggests that comprehensive land reform in the
major countries of Latin America (excluding Mexico and Bolivia, which have
already undertaken broad land reform) involves only about 75 million acres of land.
At a cost of $200 per acre (which is probably an excessive estimate), this would
indicate a total cost for the land involved of about $15 billion. The land cost
figure is probably excessive, but given related costs (incidental equipment, seed-
and-fertilizer loans, etc.) let us take $15 billion as a very tentative "ballpark"
figure for the basic land reform program. When compared with the 10-year outlay
by the United States alone-outlay in its entirety, without repayment--of some $10
billion projected for the Alliance for Progress, see, e.g., SzuLc, op. cit. supra note
10, at 241-42, an overall figure of anywhere around this order of magnitude, most
of which will not even have to be paid out, as discussed at text accompanying notes
41-55 infra, does not seem, excessive. Indeed, it seems so small in terms of the
sweeping social and political purposes which are the goals of land reform that it
seems quite incredible that such a scheme is not long under way!
It might be noted that 75 million acres would suffice to give 35 acres of land, the
minimum finally set as viable in the Puerto Rican reform after earlier experimenta-
tion with a 25 acre minimum, see Rosenn, supra note 27, at 340, to over 2.1 million
families. On the basis of around 6 persons per family (see YEARBooK 652-69 for
partial figures on the average number of persons per household in Latin America)
this would account for around 12 million persons, or roughly 10% of the population of
the countries named. Actually, the land distribution in Mexico was on a basis of
about 10.4 acres of cropland per family, see WOLF, op. cit. stepra note 23, at 250,
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Whether under particular circumstances, the price paid in "cost-of-
living bonds" by the local government for land was $100 or less per
acre or $600 or more per acre, the chief compensation for the price
and in Taiwan, where rice paddies were involved, it was only about 1.8 acres, see
CHEN CHrENG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 82, so that a middle ground might suggest a
figure of perhaps twice the 2.1 million family figure. In the promising but relatively
small-scale Venezuelan program (Venezuela has, of course, far greater internal finan-
cial resources than other Latin American countries), 33,000 families had been settled
on expropriated hacienda land by the end of 1963, at an average cost-for the land
and improvements-of about $1,800 per family. With respect to the most important
variables affecting the significance of this figure: (1) the statutory priority was given
to acquisition of non-fully-exploited land; (2) land-valuation was to take into account
the last six years of production, tax value, and acquisition price of the same or neigh-
boring land, plus the value of improvements; and (3) size of a family's holding was
to be such as to permit their continuing economic progress but not to require much
non-family labor. Thus, each of these variables may suggest some reduction from a
"normal" acquisition price in the terms envisioned by this article, but their cumulative
effect does not seem such as to suggest that the $1,800 figure is far below what would
be expected under the suggested program. Thus, even if we were to double it, to take
account of possibly better land, higher valuations and greater acreage per family, such
an extrapolation from the Venezuelan experience would suggest that, for the $15
billion, land could be distributed to over 4,000,000 families ($15 billion divided by
$3,600 per family). The Venezuelan data and provisions are taken from United
Nations Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, Progress in Land Reform 4th Rep.
6-11, E/4020/Rev. 1 (1966).
It is therefore entirely conceivable that a program involving the actual outlay of
only a small fraction of $15 billion or thereabouts could result in a sweeping land
reform that would place close to half the rural population of Latin America on its
own land.
Still another method of calculation tends to confirm that the $15 billion figure is a
"ballpark" figure (if it were $20 billion or $25 billion my conclusions would not be
appreciably different). As noted above, about one-third of the total cropland, or
about 50 million acres, is in Brazil. A rough figure for the cost of the Brazilian
cropland to be acquired as part of a program of comprehensive land reform can be
developed as follows:
Following are the chief products of Brazilian cropland, as taken from YRAmBoox
128-47, together with the export value calculated for the entire crop, as derived from
United Nations, YEARBOOK OF INrERNATIONAL TRADE STATIsTicS 1963, at 88-89
(using Argentine figures for unit export value of wheat, and assuming potatoes-
which rarely are exported-to have about the same value as corn; the total sugar
figure has been estimated from export quantities only; small quantites of soybeans,
palm kernels, and groundnuts have been excluded) :
CROP QUANTITY (1000 metric tons) CALCULATED VALUE
Wheat 500 $ 32,000,000
Corn 8,000 320,000,000
Rice 5,500 473,000,000
Potatoes 1,200 48,000,000
Cocoa beans 140 70,000,000
Tobacco 200 110,000,000
Sugar 1,000 90,000,000
Cotton 650 330,000,000
Coffee 1,600 1,100,000,000
$2,573,000,000
Excluding coffee (and, as initially, grazing land and livestock production), the
total value of all crops of Brazilian cropland thus is indicated as being around $1.5
billion. The nature of the hacienda strongly suggests that we are dealing here with
the products of virtually all latifundia of that type, plus a goodly number of the
more intensively farmed plantation latifundia (particularly for cotton, tobacco,
sugar and cocoa beans), and almost certainly are dealing with the bulk of total
cropland ("There is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the special crops
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paid would normally be expected to come from the purchase price
paid by the tenant-farmers and farm laborers who wished to buy and
own the land."
Even the total amount changing hands, while substantial, would
such as sugar, coffee, and cotton, and to forget that most of the crop-land in Latin
America is used for the cultivation of such food crops as maize, tubers, beans,
and rice, which are the main items of diet for most of the inhabitants," COLE. op.
cit. supra note 9, at 132).
If we then make the assumption that our comprehensive land reform in Brazil
will encompass all of the land except that devoted to coffee and that devoted to
sugar and cotton, we arrive at an annual crop-value figure in the region of $1 billion
for all of the land involved. If we then apply the 5 times gross-crop-value figure as
the capitalization factor (recalling the 5 times annual crop value figure suggested
earlier in this footnote, based on the Taiwan experience; note that this would seem
quite in line with capitalization rates for United States commercial properties,
see ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 185), we thereby derive a preliminary valua-
tion of $5 billion for all Brazilian land to be distributed in comprehensive land
reform. It will be recalled that Brazil accounts for about one-third of the Latin
American total. "Q.E.D."
With relation both to cost and to the question of political viability, it might be
noted that landlords would probably be allowed to retain the existing manor house
and a surrounding plot of land-perhaps limited to 10% of the present holding and also
by some further factor to define the maximum permissible retained holding. Again
the question would arise whether this should be provided for, at least in terms of a
fairly liberal maximum (e.g., 1000 hectares, about 2400 acres) within the framework
of the multilateral guarantee consortium, or should be left up to the individual
participants.
I am at this stage of the proposal deliberately ignoring the important administra-
tive question of how one might go about establishing the actual production of a given
lacienda-quite possibly, certain presumptively "normal" figures could be estab-
lished for certain regions and types of operations by the administrators (note the
detailed account in CHEN CaENG, op. cit. supra note 13, of the valuation classifica-
tions and procedures in Taiwan); and the combination of this with open-market
transactions for comparable land, existing books of the enterprise and cooperative
campesinos should go far towards solving the mechanical and evidentiary end of the
valuation problem.
One last point concerning cost is the matter of debt interest. Assuming issuance
of bonds at roughly 5 times crop value, and assuming further that this would con-
stitute about 10 times the normal net return on crop (this would be the case where
a tenant farmed the land, paid the expenses, and turned over half the total crop to
the landowner), a 10% interest rate would duplicate the landlord's current annual
income. However, it would seem that a rate of around 6% would be quite fair, and
would compare favorably with existing Latin American interest rates which are
calculated on a basis, unlike interest on the land-reform bonds, which would be
fully subject to inflationary pressure. Recent central bank interest rates, on an
inflation-subject basis, have run about 8% in Columbia, 12% in Brazil, and 15.8% in
Chile. See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 4, 1966, p. 1, col. 6. To make the 6% rate more
fully comparable with the present income of the landowners, it may be that
participating governments should be encouraged-or even required as part of the
guarantee program-to exempt interest on the land-reform bonds from all taxes
so long as the bonds remained in the hands of the original holder or the heir or
legatee of a deceased original holder. Further "sweetening" might be provided
through the equity-participation aspects of the proposal in footnote 55 infra. (The
"second-layer" bonds issued under such a proposal would, presumably, also be
afforded the benefits of tax exemption.)
" The further complications arising from the possible need to operate some
lands in a broader, cooperative fashion to make them economically viable will not
be dealt with here. The legal techniques suggested in the present article do not, of
course, commit the reformers to land distribution on any rigid one-man one-farm
basis, but the problem is sufficiently closely related in a practical sense that the
author intends to include further consideration of it in a later article. See generally
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quite probably not be exceptional in terms of existing aid programs."
But most of it would ultimately be recovered in the form of a payment
to the government by the new owners of part of the surplus created
by their capital and labor, which formerly went to the landlord as
the tenants' crop-sharing payment or as the landlords' profit on the
labors of the salaried workers. The government in turn would have
paid an approximately equivalent sum to the landlord. Amortization
of the bond indebtedness through such repayments by tenants was
virtually on a one-to-one basis in the Formosan reform,43 and obtaining
primary repayment from the new cultivator seems generally both
feasible and desirable.44 It has been suggested that the price to be
paid by the new owners may be "considerably different" from the
price paid the landlord,40 but at least in the setting of the present
proposal, this difference may well be minimized. In the first place,
the likelihood that the hacienda type of non-intensive operation will
Digby, Co-Operatives and Land Use, FAO Agricultural Development Paper No.
61 (1957); see also Rosenn, supra note 27, for a description of the tiny agregado
holding and the "proportional profit" type of collective, patterns somewhat different
from the tiny subsistence-level minifundia and the Mexican-type collective, the
Jjido, which sometimes seem the only alternate patterns offered. The Puerto Rican
experience with 35-acre tracts has been referred to in footnote 40 supra.
With respect to the hacienda type of operation, it may be worth noting that many
of these have attached to them today highly integrated communities which should be
several steps towards the creation of cooperative-type farming arrangements, if this
is desirable. See Tannenbaum, The Hacienda, in MArz 27-28.
Even in those areas of Latin American where there is considerable undeveloped
land, see generally COLE, op. cit. supra note 9, fig. 13, at 131, the handing over of
existing estates, with priority given to those who presently work them as tenants or
as labor, seems a considerably better alternative than attempting to develop new
public lands, with the vast improvement expenditures and the great time lag this
would entail, as well as the immense difficulties involved in uprooting and re-
organizing existing campesino communities. See Karst, supra note 12, at 364;
Carroll, The Land Reform Isste in Latin America, in MArrz 178-79. But cf.
Galbraith & Morton, op. cit. supra note 31, at 495, 499, which tends-without
reaching any conclusion-to emphasize the relative-cost factor and to de-emphasize
the time and social factors. See also note 55 infra.
" See note 40 supra.
'See CHEN CHENG, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 78. The purchase price, like the
price paid the landlords, was calculated at 2r times the main crop yield, and was
repayable in 20 equal installments over a 10 year period, the latter also being the
maturity period of the bonds issued to the ex-landlords.
,See Galbraith & Morton, op. cit. supra note 31, at 492.
"Id. at 494:
The cost of land to the government depends on the price paid to former
landlords or on the costs of preparing the land for distribution out of the public
domain. The price which the new farm owners can afford to pay may be
considerably different. Also, it may be the aim of public policy to sell the land
to farmers at a subsidized price, if the society is rich enough to shift this
burden to the general public.
It should be noted that the sudden accession of purchasing power in the hands of
campesinos-if payment is arranged so as to lead to a large, abrupt increase in their
nominal cash income-might prove almost as inflationary, and hence almost illusory,
as an attempted "compensation" of the landlords in cash. See Note 31, supra. (I am
indebted to Philip French of the University of Washington Business School for this
suggestion.)
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be the primary source of the land to be redistributed46 suggests that
a sharp decline in level of cultivation is improbable. In Formosa,
where non-complexly-organized rice paddy hand-farming was princi-
pally involved, productivity per unit of land rose by about one-fifth
when rents were reduced to 3 7.5 per cent, and rose by another one-third
when the land was distributed.17  In the second place, reflection on
the figure suggested as being tolerably within the normal valuation
range (five-times gross crop value)48 will show that a campesino who
has been paying anywhere near half the crop value to the landlord
(or, if a laborer, letting the landlord retain half or more of the crop
value) should be able to pay off the full value of the land, with 6 per
cent interest,4" in a little over 10 years, without suffering any loss in
"See note 40 supra. See also note 55 infra.
'See CHEN CHENG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 313. In Mexico, total agricultural
production (which may, of course, reflect a number of variables other than land
reform), "has been growing (1952-1959) at the remarkable rate of 7.1% per year, far
outstripping growth rates in countries that have superior land resources, such as
Argentina and Chile." Karst, mtpra note 12, at 359 n.120. Longer-term deficit
problems may certainly arise, but appear likely to be related to the separable problem
of population growth (although, from a Malthusian standpoint, temporarily in-
creased prosperity arising from land reform might well give rise to the planning of
larger families, and it would seem well not to forget this different, but equally
critical, problem). See WOLF, op. cit. supra note 23, at 250; Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 12, 1966, p. 14, col. 4-5 (serious Mexican food shortage predicted by 1975, when
population will be 50% greater than today).
ARDREY, THE TERRuTORiAL ImPERATIVE 113-16 (1966), has some interesting ob-
servations on the views of the so-called "new biology" on the relation between man's
instinctive attachment to a piece of territory and the productivity of owner-
worked farmland, in the context of comparative United States and Russian agricul-
tural achievements. After noting that in the United States "one worker on a farm
produces food for himself and for almost twelve more in the city," while in Russia
the same ratio is only one-to-one, Ardrey states, id. at 114-16:
The smallness of American farms is among the best-kept secrets in the arsenal of
American power. The Soviet Union's collective farms, in which workers shared
until 1966 nothing but surplus earnings, average 15,000 acres, each with about
400 families. The state farm, hiring all workers at a fixed wage, averages
70,000 acres and employs 800 workers. Yet of America's two and one half million
commercial farms, only one in ten is over 500 acres. The average number of
workers, including the farmer and his sons if he has any, is five. Despite
those advances in farm machinery which permit a worker to cultivate an acreage
far greater than in Lincoln's day, still half of our farms are no larger now than
then. The factory-in-the-field exists, but it is of minor significance. The
American agricultural miracle has been produced by a man and his wife with a
helper or two on a pair territory ....
From the days of Stalin's enforced collectivization of the land, the peasant has
been permitted to retain a tiny private plot for family cultivation. It is the
last bedraggled remnant of the pair territory in the Soviet Union, and in times
of political crisis and ideological pressure its size has been reduced. Today
the private plot averages half an acre in size, but there is little likelihood of
further reduction. Without it Russia would starve.
Private plots occupy about 3 percent of all Russian cultivated land, yet they
produce almost half of all vegetables consumed, almost half of all milk and meat,
three-quarters of all eggs, and two-thirds of that staff of Russian life, potatoes.
See note 40 mipra.
"Possibly interest on the debt of the buyer should be less than that paid on the
debt owed the ex-landlord. If so, this might be another area in which the interna-
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income. Since, however, it would be an important part of the land
reform program to improve his income immediately, a substantially
lower repayment schedule over a longer period, say 15 or 20 years,
would seem desirable50
There appear to remain only two main areas of potential "slippage"
between these payments-cainpesino-owner to government and govern-
ment to former landlord-which would be subjects for payment by
the international guaranteeing consortium and potential sources of
cost to it. First, the landholder would probably, for reasons developed
above, be paid interest and principal in cash amounts which reflected
the general inflationary trend in the country's economy. The land
purchaser, by contrast, might well be expected to pay in installments
which were tied to the value of the main crop of the land. If, for
example, the landlord were to be paid in installments equal to the
current value of 5 pounds of each of 20 basic commodities listed on
a government index (sugar, rice, wheat, coffee, butter, corn, etc.),
the value of this 100-pound assortment of goods might be 17 units
of local currency, versus a value of 10 units for the same assortment
when the bond was issued. On the other hand, the land-purchaser
might have undertaken a coordinate obligation to pay an installment
equivalent to the value of 50 pounds of coffee, which reflected the
fact that, at the time he entered his purchase contract, 50 pounds
of coffee were worth 10 units of the local currency. But despite the
tional guarantors should subsidize the reform program. If a $15 billion indebted-
ness is assumed, see note 40 supra, the difference between, say, 6% interest paid to the
ex-landlord and 4% paid by the new owners, calculated on the total amount, would
be $300 million annually. Such a subsidy might also be necessary if the money
paid into the sinking fund could not earn as high a rate of interest as that being
paid on the ex-landlord's bonds. See note 54 infra. It might, of course, be necessary
to retire at least part of the bond issue-say one-half, in the terms of the example
in note 55 infra-through payment of annual installments of principal in order to
achieve an adequate degree of palatability to the landlords (less likely if the bonds
are negotiable, certainly to the degree the market holds up, although this would not
be a demonstrable fact when at least the initial bond issues had their "terms and
conditions" fixed-again, see note 55 infra). If so, the sinking fund payments in
part would simply move through the depository as a conduit to the ex-landlords.
"Any plans for immediate income-improvement would, of course, have to keep
clearly in view the inflation problem referred to in note 45, supra. As pointed out in
note 55 infra, it might well be that a substantial proportion of the ex-landlords' bonds
also bore maturities of more than 10 years. Assuming, however, that they all bore
10-year maturities, the result of spreading the buyers' sinking-fund payments over a
longer period might be that the consortium would have to advance a portion (up to
half) of the land repayment price to the local government against the continuing
obligation of the new owners to repay. However, if the bonds had proved desirable
holdings-and 6% inflation-proof bonds thus guaranteed, if negotiable, might indeed
turn out to sell at a premium on the open market-it might well prove possible to
refinance most of the debt with a new issue of similar bonds to the existing holders.
A 10-year initial maturity, in other words, would only have been chosen in deference
to some putative "gun-shyness" of the initial holders.
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greater general inflation, 50 pounds of coffee are now worth only
14 units of the local currency, or perhaps are worth only 9 units,
due to a collapse of export prices. If the campesino-owner's obligation
is measured in the value of some general cost-of-living index, he may
bear the brunt of "slippages" between the index and specific com-
modity prices which represent his own actual livelihood. This seems
highly undesirable if lasting land reform is to be achieved, rather
than a cycle of bankruptcies and return to former owners or to the
government as a kind of superlandlord. However, if the campesino-
owner's obligation is to be measured in units of the main crop of his
own land, he only pays 14 (or 9) units of the local currency to the
government, which pays out 17 to the ex-landlord bondholder. It
would appear an appropriate function of the international insuring
consortium to make good, without reimbursement from the local gov-
ernment, the difference due to this kind of "slippage." It would seem
that a guaranty against this kind of risk would help to make land
reform palatable to the government, as such, as well as to the landlords.
This seems especially so since risks of this kind of relative price
decline seem generally greater for export-commodities,"' and it is
proposed consortium members who would bear much of the onus
in the eyes of the local government if such a decline took place.;
2
Indeed, the existence of the insuring obligation might lend to a stim-
ulus to joint programs for stabilization of basic commodity prices.ra
The second major area of potential liability of the insurers would be
default by the land-buyers. Each year a certain number of new owners
could be expected to go under (field research might help considerably
in predicting how many), but in general it would be expected that
' See not 35 supra. With reference to the textual example, if, per contra, the
particular commodity grown on the land outdistanced the general index (the stated
number of pounds, let us say, had gone in value from 10 units up to 19 units of the
local currency), the new owner's obligation should probably be, by a parity of reason-
ing, to pay 19 units: in return for not bearing the brunt of disadvantageous relative
price fluctuations, he would give up the windfall of advantageous ones during the period
of repayment. Most fluctuations in commodity prices would thus turn out to be
mutually cancelling as far as actual outlays by the guarantors were concerned.
" See, e.g., Pincus, What Policy for Commodities, 42 FoPEIGI AYFAmrs 227 (1964),
in which the author reviews the problem of price declines in the commodity exports
of the developing nations and discusses the position sometimes put forward by repre-
sentatives of the latter that "the only thing that is lacking is willingness on the part
of industrial nations to cooperate" in stabilization agreements. Id. at 232.
See generally PROCEEDINGS. The problem referred to in text might be lessened
to the extent that the effect of making the hacienda-type establishments the primary
source of land acquired for redistribution was also to make the new owners'
obligations to repay chiefly expressible in terms of basic domestically-consumed
commodities. However, even commodities like rice have suffered some fairly sub-
stantial changes in export value. See id. at 293, table 4.1/I (25% decline in export
value of rice from 1948-1950 to 1960-1962).
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a new campesino could be found to assume the obligation to purchase
the land. In a few cases, such a buyer might not be found, or might
be found only at a substantial discount (there might also be some
cases where no initial buyers at the "fair value" determined for the
land could be found). Widespread flooding or erosion might bring
about such a situation on a regional basis. Thus a second function
of the consortium would appear to be to insure against losses actually
suffered by the local government due to purchasers' defaults in pay-
ments including, in effect, insurance against major natural catastrophes
bringing about such defaults1 4
Thus the mechanism of joint developed-country guarantees or
"insurance" could be expected, at what would appear to be relatively
little cost to the guarantors, to add immensely to the local political
credibility and viability of any land reform program 5
"' Normally all purchasers' payments would presumably channel into a sinking
fund to be used for retirement of the bonded indebtedness to the landlords, which
would of course be the primary obligation of the local government, and only
secondarily the obligation of the international guaranteeing agency. Thus what the
text suggests is an obligation of the guarantors to make good any deficit in such
payment actually resulting from purchasers' defaults which had reached the level of
recognizable bad debts (quite possibly to be defined with particularity as part of the
guarantee "contract") without any obligation on the part of the primary obligee-
the local government-to reimburse the guarantors. However, with respect at least
to defaults occurring for reasons other than sudden natural calamities, it might be
well to compensate the local government on something like a 90-10 or 80-20 basis;
that is, have the latter be responsible to reimburse the guarantors for 10% or 20% of
the amount in default, in order to assure local diligence in limiting the net defaulted
amount. Presumably the more concrete the safeguards of such diligence which could
be spelled out as part of the basic arrangements between the guaranteeing agency
and the local government, the lower would the local governments' share in the
"co-insurance" feature have to be. The presence and size of this co-insurance
feature might also have importance in determining the extent to which the hacienda
was given priority over the high-value, complexly organized plantation in the land-
acquisition plan, since the likelihood and the magnitude of possible new-owner
defaults would probably be predicted to be significantly related to the expropriation
"mx." See also note 38 supra.
' A number of "second-layer" proposals probably should be considered to allow
the channeling of as much of the consideration received by the former landowners as
possible into industrial development-the patrons, that is, should be transformed into
industrialists-through encouraging or requiring the investment of a substantial
portion of the proceeds in internal development projects. See Bunce, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 484-85. In Taiwan, it will be recalled, 30% of the value calculated for the
land was paid in shares of development enterprises. These were stocks of four
government enterprises, operating in the cement, pulp and paper, industrial and
mining, and agriculture and forestry development fields, respectively. See CHEN
CHENG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 77.
One possible proposal might be as follows: On the assumption of basic payment in
6% cost-of-living bonds (see note 40 supra), one half of the bonds issued would be of
10-year maturity and freely negotiable, although they could if the holder desired be
invested in the same way as the other half of the bonds. The latter would bear the
same interest but would be of somewhat longer maturity and would be required to
be contributed to the capital of any one of a series of development corporations
formed by the government, probably, within overall limits, in whatever proportion
the holder might choose among the various development corporations. The holder
would then be issued two series of instruments by the development corporations.
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CONCLUSION
It would seem that a politically viable and not prohibitively expen-
sive means of effectuating land reform in Latin America can be devel-
One would be bonds, of the same maturity and interest rate as the originals, the
interest and principal payments likewise calculated in terms of the variation of a
general cost-of-living standard, and likewise guaranteed (a second-layer guarantee)
by the international consortium, although with the primary obligation to pay of the
government development corporation secured by something like 75%, rather than
1001o of the value of the originally contributed "first series" of bonds. Secondly, the
development corporation would issue equity participation in proportion to the
bondholdings, the stock probably to be of low or no par value, and to be voting or not
as the local authorities might choose.
The originally contributed bonds would continue to be "inflation-proof" and to
bear the full international guarantee in the hands of the development corporations.
The approximately 25% of the value not held as security for the payment of the
"second-layer" bonds could be used to secure the borrowing of funds to finance
development projects. Assuming landlord investment of one-half of around $15
billion (see note 40 supra), 25% of this would be about $1.75 billion. This should get
such a series of partially-internally-financed development corporations well under-
way, and they could then become, very appropriately, the focus for a significant
proportion of normal Alliance for Progress aid funds.
It would seem desirable in those countries with large quantities of undeveloped
land that one of the development corporations should have the function of developing
new cropland. It might be possible to enlist the managerial talents of the investing
ex-landlords in this relatively long-term land development project by giving to
holders of equity units the right to manage a corresponding number of units of
newly-opened lands, with some profit-sharing incentive. (Some lessons on how to run
or not to run such an enterprise, which likely would also involve profit-sharing with
the farm workers, can probably be gained from the Puerto Rican experience with
"proportional profit" farms, see Rosenn, supra note 27, at 343 n.47.)
Presumably other of the development corporations could undertake profitable
activities in connection with the development of existing argicultural enterprises,
with a substantial, but not exclusive, focus on the new holdings created by the
land-reform program. Thus, one development corporation might function in financing
seed, fertilizer, capital-improvement and machinery loans, and also as a common
4uantity-buying agency for such items. It or other development corporations might
also function in the establishment of such agriculture-connected operations as those
undertaken by the Puerto Rican Land Authority: canning factories, fertilizer
production, land reclamation and the operation of machinery-rental centers. See
id. at 353-55.
Beyond their insurance liability, the consortium of developed countries should
probably be prepared to undertake substantial outlays for a number of subsidiary
features of a successful land-reform program. Again, there would arise the question
of the extent to which these features should be spelled out as part of the basic
guarantee agreement:
(a) In some cases an extensive program of land-surveying and investigation
of land titles might have to be carried out, with teams including experi-
enced surveyors and administrators, in order to ensure that campesihws
would receive indefeasible title to a well-defined plot. Cf. CHEN CHENG.
op. cit. supra note 13, at 2.
(b) At this and later stages, an expeditious system of conciliation and arbitra-
tion tribunals might have to be set up to process disputes.(c) Farmers would probably need seed, fertilizer and equipment loans, as noted
above. Apart from the possible development-corporation source of financing,
if local banks were short of funds, grants from the consortium or from an
existing international lending institution might be made. In any event,
the guarantee features of the arrangement conceivably might be extended to
guaranteeing repayment of the loans made by state agencies to the campe-
sinos for the purpose.
(d) Considerable field training in modern agricultural techniques, and, especially,
in the case of any cooperative enterprises, in administration, might be a
highly desirable part of the total program.
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oped by combining legal notions of "just compensation" from United
States and international jurisprudence with a relatively straight-for-
ward multilateral insuring mechanism. Attempts to formulate land
reform programs based on marked departures from full-compensation
concepts can, from this perspective, be seen as unnecessary in any
theoretical financing sense, and consequently more easily seen as
utterly self-defeating in a political and practical sense.
It might be noted that the concession arguendo in which I originally
indulged-that all the landlords are monsters of iniquityl 6-- is of
course a deliberately unrealistic one. Categorical application of limi-
ted-compensation or no-compensation concepts should be seen as fur-
ther tainted by what it really is: application of criminal penalties
without the particularzation of charges and procedures which form
a part of all civilized criminal jurisprudence. The most recent pur-
chaser or inheritor of land, the responsible corporate landholder, and
Simon Legree are thereby all dealt with on an equal footing.
It is time to turn from arid discussion of how to euchre the landlords
to a consideration of methods for accomplishing land reform in the
real world.
" Or, putting it in terms of some of the categories developed in the discussion,
one might alternately phrase it in terms of "all the hacienda holders."

